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Did FDI Increase Wage Inequality in Transition Economies? 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Purpose of this paper -The last two decades have been characterised by a rise in income and 
wage inequality in a wide range of countries, including European transition countries. The 
rise in globalisation is one major factor explaining this increasing wage inequality. 
International trade and FDI have increased significantly since the beginning of transition and 
this paper focuses onexamines whether FDI plays an important role in explaining the pattern 
of wage inequality in selected transition countries. 
Design/methodology/approach- A cross-country empirical investigation has been conducted 
using two alternative measures of wage inequality: the Gini coefficient and the Theil index. 
Several model specifications and estimation strategies have been employed to obtain 
consistent estimates and to check for the robustness of the results. 
Findings- The results indicate that a rising share of inward FDI in GDP increased wage 
inequality in transition economies, though its overall effect was relatively small. Considering 
the long run, there is no clear evidence of a concave relationship between FDI and wage 
inequality, which may be a consequence of the relatively low high levels of FDI in manyost 
transition countries. 
Practical implications -Inwards FDI has made a small contribution to increasing wage 
inequality in European transition economies. However, its overall beneficial effects on labour 
markets in these countries suggests that rather than restricting FDI governments should target 
increasing the supply of skilled labour.  
What is original/value of paper- This new empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that 
an increased inward FDI stock as a share of GDP increases wage inequality in transition 
economies, however this relationship ismay be a complex one. Differences in average wages, 
wage differentials, employment shares of skilled workers and relative size of the foreign-
owned sector are all likely to be important for the behaviour of wage inequality. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
International trade and fForeign direct investment inflows have increased significantly in 
European transition economies during the transition period. The resulting inflows of capital 
and technology affected the demand for labour and accordingly employment, productivity, 
wage levels and differentials and wage inequality. This paper focuses on a largely neglected 
area: the effect of inwards FDI on wage inequality in European transition economies (ETEs). 
Mitra and Yemtsov (2006) recorded the rise in inequality during transition but pointed out the 
diversity of outcomes across these countries. There is a significant body of research looking 
at the impact of FDI on wage inequality in other groups of countries. Hale and Xu’s (20167) 
meta-analysis of that empirical literature concludes that in both developed and developing 
countries FDI increases the demand for skilled labour in host countries, increasing the overall 
demand for labour whilst raising skill premiums and average productivity and wages. They 
find that three-quarters of studies found a positive effect on wage inequality. Of particular 
interest for this study of ETEs, is their finding that the effects of FDI on host country labour 
markets were stronger in countries with scarce skilled labour and large technological gaps., 
which has motivated scholars to examine the impact of these factors on the labour market and 
more specifically on wage inequality. This paper examines whether inward FDI plays a major 
role in explaining the pattern of wage inequality in transition countries. Feenstra and Hanson 
(2001) argue that both trade in intermediate inputs and skilled-biased, technological change 
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have decreased the demand for low skilled labour and increased the  relative demand and 
wages of the higher skilled. Analysis presented in  Pprevious research suggestsed that the net 
effect of FDI on wage inequality will depend on how large are the relative skill wage 
differences between foreign-owned firms and domestic owned firms, the relative skill-
intensity of employment in foreign-owned firms compared to domestic ones and the relative 
size of the foreign-owned sector (Feenstra and Hanson, 20031; OECD, 2002; Estrin, 2017).  
 
Notwithstanding the effects ofBefore the Global Financial Crisis, in their first two decades 
most ETEstransition economies had made significant progress in attracting FDI (UNCTAD, 
2012). The decline in FDI flows during 2009 and 2010 in transition economies was halted in 
2011, where FDI flows increased by 25% reaching $92 billion driven mainly by cross-border 
M&A (UNCTAD, 2012). Very large inflows have been attracted by the larger economies, 
such as Russia and Poland ($418,982 million and $180,836 million between 1995 and 2012). 
Whereas, tiny inflows, less than $6 million over the period 1995 to 2012, characterize some 
low and middle-income transition economies, such as Armenia, Macedonia, Moldova, 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, attracted less than $6m inflows during this period (Zulfiu-Alili, 
2014). The increase in FDI into transition economies, especially after 2006, has been 
attributed to economic recovery and reform, a better investment climate, increased openness 
to FDI and the start of association (and accession) negotiations with the EU from 2005 
(UNCTAD, 2010; 2013). FDI inflows to transition economies were not only directed at the 
most labour-intensive and low-value-added activities but also, increasingly, at more 
innovative and technology-intensive activities (UNCTAD, 2010). In South-East European 
countries, FDI into manufacturing sector increased as a result of competitive production costs 
and open access to EU markets, whereas the CIS resource-based economies benefited from 
continued natural resource-seeking FDI. 
 
Given that wages are the main source of income in transition countries, it is expected that 
changes in wage inequality drive changes in income inequality in ETEs. In assessing wage 
inequality most studies utilise the Gini coefficient as the measure of inequality. The size of 
these coefficients increased considerably after 1990s in transition countries (Milanovic, 1999; 
Milanovic, 2011). The evolution of the Gini coefficients for individual transition countries for 
which data are available show that Azerbaijan, Russia and Kyrgyzstan have experienced the 
highest levels of inequality during the period from 1997 to 2006, above 0.5 (Figure 1). There 
is some evidence of an inverse-U pattern whereby inequality first increases and later falls as 
an economy develops. The lowest level of inequality among transition countries was found in 
the Czech Republic (0.26) and overall CEE countries now have, on average, similar levels of 
inequality to those found in EU15 countries (Roaf et al., 2014). Macedonia (0.28), Poland 
(0.30), Serbia (0.32) and Romania (0.35) have upward trends in wage inequality from 1993 to 
2008.  
 
Figure 1. Distribution of earnings in selected transition economies: Gini coefficient 
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Source:  Author’s own figure based on TRANSMONEE database, 2012. 
 
Wage inequality was generally higher in CIS countries than in CEE and SEE countries. These 
increases in inequality have been attributed to a range of factors, such as globalisation, 
skilled-biased technological change, differential access to schooling, labour reallocation, high 
unemployment and institutional changes (Franco and Gerussi, 2010; Rose, 2014; Aristei and 
Perugini, 2014; Satti et al., 2015; Tyrowicz et al., 2017). Whilst the diversity of experience 
amongst ETEs has been attributed to differences in initial conditions, country specifics and 
policy choices (Mitra and Yemtsov, 2006). 
 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 a review of relevant theory 
and previous empirical research is presented. This discussion informs the specification of the 
model of wage inequality presented in Section 3. This section also explains the data used and 
examines the descriptive statistics of the variables of interest. The empirical approach taken 
to estimate the wage inequality model is explained in Section 4. The following section 
presents and interprets the results, with alternative measures of wage inequality providing a 
robustness check. Section 6 is devoted to concluding remarks and consideration of the policy 
implications of the main findings. 
 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL ANALYSES 
Previous research indicates that the most important source of increasing labour market 
inequality derives from a widening in the dispersion of wages and from the growth of non-
wage incomes associated with self-employment and entrepreneurial activities. Aghion and 
Commander (1999) argue that both between-group and within-group inequality have 
increased as a result of changes in the relative demand for skilled and unskilled labour in 
transition countries. The leading explanations for this change areis trade liberalisation and 
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skilled-biased technological change, in both of these cases FDI is likely to play a key causal 
role.  
 
According to the conventional explanation, shifts in labour demand towards skilled play an 
important role in explaining the widening earnings dispersion. Among the main factors 
driving these demand shifts is technological change (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011). Snower 
(1999) argues that one should look for major structural changes affecting economies over the 
past two decades in order to explain the relative demand shift for skills. Previous research 
generally attributes increased wage inequality in developed countries primarily to increases in 
the relative demand for high-skill versus low-skill labour as a consequence of the skilled-
biased technological change (Prasad, 2002). Keane and Prasad (2006) indicate that in the case 
of transition countries the increased wage inequality as a result of increased wage premium 
for college educated workers during the transition can reflect two situations. First, due to 
skill-biased technological changes workers now have better opportunities for matching with 
their most productive activities, so the skills generated by education became more productive. 
Second, the end of wage compression as market forces induce wages to become more closely 
aligned to labour productivities. 
 
The impact of skill-biased technological change on wage inequality has been explained using 
the theoretical framework of Aghion and Howitt (1998) and Aghion and Commander (1999) 
where wage inequality is examined in a model of a general purpose technology (GPT). This 
is a model of major technological change through social learning: a process where firms learn 
to adopt a new technology or organizational form through observing the experience of other 
firms using it. This model is likely to be particularly appropriate to transition countries 
experiencing a rapid inflow of FDI. At the beginning of the transition period wage inequality 
increases due to the increased demand and wages for skilled labour, however in the later 
phase, wage inequality may decrease as the supply of skilled labour may increase, which in 
this model is explained through the two phases of GPT. The GPT theoretical framework has 
been used by Figini and Görg (2011) to analyse the relationship between FDI and wage 
inequality and to test whether the effect of FDI on wage inequality is non-linear in a cross-
country context and it is incorporated into the empirical specification employed below. Figini 
and Görg suggest that the relationship is non-linear, with the effect of FDI on wage inequality 
depending on the level of economic development of countries. In developing countries 
(which includes the transition economies) wage inequality increases (albeit at a decreasing 
rate) with the FDI stock, which is in line with the inverted-U pattern for the relationship 
between FDI and wage inequality. Mahutga and Bandelj (2008) discuss the question of how 
FDI affects inequality using the Gini index as their measure of inequality (calculated from 
household earnings). They expect FDI to contribute to rising inequality by increasing wage 
inequality between management and labour within the foreign sector. Their results indicate 
that foreign investment has a positive effect on income inequality in CEE, no matter how FDI 
is measured. FDI increases inequality between management and labour within the foreign-
owned sector, and between foreign and domestic sectors, where foreign-owned firms pay 
higher wages relative to domestic ones. They tentatively conclude that inwards FDI is a 
powerful determinant of the behaviour of income inequality in transition countries.  
 
The argument that increasing trade openness is linked to increases in wage inequality was 
initially examined through the Hecksher-Ohlin and Stolper-Samuelson models. According to 
the Stolper-Samuelson model, free trade would raise the incomes of the abundant factors of 
production and lower the returns to the scarce factors of production (Jensen and Rosas, 2007). 
This model in the simplest 2x2 version predicts that countries abundant in unskilled labour 
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will specialise in unskilled-labour-intensive products. Therefore trade liberalisation should 
increase the price of the intensively used factor (i.e. unskilled labour) and decrease the price 
of the skilled-labour intensive imported products and hence decrease the wages of domestic 
skilled labour (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007), leading to decreasing wage inequality. Hence, 
in developing and some transition countries abundant with unskilled labour, according to this 
theory production and/or exports should be concentrated in unskilled labour- intensive 
sectors, increasing the relative demand for unskilled labour and decreasing inequality 
between skilled and unskilled workers. However, there is little evidence in the literature that 
directly supports the HO and Stolper-Samuelson theorems (Higgins and Williamson, 1999; 
Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007; Meschi and Vivarelli, 2007). Krugman (2008) argues that this 
may be a result of the short period of data covered in some studies (up to 5 years). According 
to Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007), most of the studies that do support HO and Stolper-
Samuelson theorems and find that exporting sectors in developing countries were less skill-
intensive than the import-competing sectors, only cover the period until mid-1980s and do 
not distinguish between higher-skilled and lower-skilled trading partners for each developing 
country. If a country is an exporter of skill-intensive products and an importer of goods 
produced by low-skilled labour, trade liberalisation with developing countries will increase 
the effective supply of goods produced by low-skilled labour (Topel, 1997). These goods will 
have lower prices in the international market which implies a reduction in the domestic 
production of goods produced by low-skilled labour and probably leading to rise in wage 
inequality. As increased trade openness shifts production toward specialisation on the basis of 
comparative advantage in skill-intensive products then the elasticity of substitution in 
production between high-skill and low-skill labour becomes the key parameter. If the 
substitution between high-skill and low-skill workers is more inelastic, then even a small 
increase in the share of imports in aggregate income may have a large impact on wages, i.e. 
increasing wage inequality, but if substitution is more elastic, then increased trade is unlikely 
to cause greater wage inequality.  
 
Kuznets (1955) posed the hypothesis that inequality increases in the early stages of economic 
development and decreases after a certain average income is attained. His empirical evidence 
suggested that income inequality is increasing in the early phases of industrialisation and 
urbanisation, when the agricultural and rural sector dominates in the economy. Discussing the 
movement from agricultural to the industrial sector and from rural to urban locations Kuznets 
argues that rural population has a lower average income per capita compared to urban 
population and lower income inequality. In the early phase of economic development the gap 
between the rural and urban average per capita income will increase, because the industrial 
productivity in urban areas increases more rapidly. This will initiate migration from rural to 
urban areas contributing to increases in the economy’s overall degree of inequality as a result 
of a rise in per capita income of the persons who move. However, this movement depresses 
urban wages and raises relative wages in rural areas as a result of the decreasing size of the 
agricultural labour force. Kuznets (1955) argues that after the early stage of industrialisation 
and urbanisation and the increase in the ‘native’ urban population, i.e. population which is 
born in cities rather than in rural areas, the income share of the lower-income groups of the 
urban population will rise. The ‘native’ population is more capable of using the economic and 
political possibilities of the city and securing higher income shares, than the people 
immigrating from the countryside or abroad, and this decreases overall income inequality. 
However, Kuznets in this study does not fully explain the demographic, political and social 
factors that could contribute to the decline in the shares of the lower income groups and 
technical change is neglected (Aghion and Howitt,  1998). 
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However, as Peter (2003) argues, it is not yet clear to what extent cross-country differences in 
returns to skills are driven by: technological change; changes in the education and experience 
premia; globalisation factors; country-specific wage determination processes and other 
institutional rigidities. The increased earnings inequality in transition countries was in part 
attributable to increases in the education premium and to the growth of within-sector 
inequality as a result of market liberalisation and institutional changes. As Galor and Moav 
(2000) argue, the rise in skill-biased technological change raises the rate of return to skill. 
This increase in the return to skills stimulates an increase in the supply of educated labour, 
dependent upon the size of the wage-elasticity of the supply of skilled labour, which leads to 
a further increase in the rate of technological progress. The increase in the level of human 
capital and technological progress can lead to a monotonic rise in wage inequality, both 
within and between groups along the transition to a steady-state equilibrium (Galor and 
Moav, 2000).  
  
In transition economies, given the lack of effective technology transfer from their R&D 
sector to industry, technological change is determined mainly by technology diffusion from 
trade and FDI across borders (Gurbiel, 2002; UNCTAD, 2003; Keller, 2004).  Considering 
that foreign-owned firms typically use more advanced technologies, their entrance will create 
changes in the composition of jobs by increasing the demand for skills and more educated 
workers and raising the skill premium. Accordingly foreign-owned firms will typically pay 
higher wages than domestic owned firms and increase wage inequality between groups. The 
increased demand for a skilled and more educated labour force which results in a higher skill 
premium and higher returns to education should increase the incentive for investing in 
education, hence in the long-run increase the supply of skills and more educated workers and 
offset the increased wage inequality (Galor and Moav, 2000). Given that wages are the main 
source of income in transition countries, it is expected that changes in wage inequality drive 
changes in income inequality in these countries. For this reason and given the scarcity of 
previous relevant research on the role of FDI, both wage and income inequality studies are 
reviewed. Firstly, cross-country analyses on the effect of FDI and trade on wage inequality 
and income distribution are reviewed. Secondly, the focus shifts to single country studies of 
the effects of FDI on wage inequality.  
 
Transition countries experienced a sharp increase in unemployment (especially amongst less-
educated groups), especially in the countries of South Eastern Europe (KILM, 20151). As a 
result of structural changes unemployment increased sharply during the initial transition 
period in most of these countries. According to the Aghion and Blanchard (1994) model, this 
occurred mainly as a result of the closure of state enterprises. The movement of labour from 
the state to the private sector involved a rise in unemployment and change in wages. The 
private sector creates jobs but sets wages according to market conditions. When the state 
sector is decreasing, unemployment increases competing wages down. This should help the 
private sector create new jobs, but higher unemployment leads to higher taxes per employed 
worker, since the state typically provides unemployment benefits which leads to a decrease in 
private job creation. Biewen and Juhasz (2010) argue that this rising unemployment increased 
personal income inequality because unemployment benefits are usually lower than the former 
wage incomes. The contribution of unemployment to wage inequality will be larger if more 
unemployment growth is concentrated in the lower part of the income distribution, in line 
with the hypothesis that skill-biased technological progress especially affects the employment 
prospects of low-skilled worker. 
                                                
1 Key Indicators of the Labour Market (KILM from ILO), data extracted on 12.11.2017. 
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Most of transition countries are characterised by low or no safety nets in terms of benefits. 
This may affect the distribution of wages by lowering the wages of less skilled workers 
contributing to increases in wage inequality (Boeri and Terrell, 2002). To capture institutional 
differences in the labour market the Index of Economic Freedom (IEF) is included in the 
wage inequality model. The relationship between the IEF and wage inequality is expected to 
be positive since higher values of this index for a country imply less interference in the 
market, for example a weaker influence of unions and minimum wage legislation, leading to 
higher wage inequality2. 
 
Bruno et al. (2004) analyse whether FDI has contributed to a rise in earning inequality and to 
the change in the skill composition of labour demand in Poland, Hungary and the Czech 
Republic, the three European transition economies with the largest FDI inflows during the 
1990s. They use industry-year panel data for six sectors for the period 1993-2000. To proxy 
FDI penetration they use the inward FDI stocks. Earning inequality and composition of 
labour demand are proxied by the skilled labour shares of the total wage-bill and total 
employment. To account for other possible factors influencing wage inequality they include 
business enterprise expenditure on R&D (as a proxy for the influence of technical progress), 
exports and imports of final goods to account for the effects of international trade on relative 
factor prices and to control for industry-scale effects they include gross value added. Their 
results suggest that FDI has not worsened wage inequality through labour demand shifts, but 
it has contributed to raising the skill-premium. Hence, they conclude that multinational firms 
affect the transition restructuring process mainly by favouring workers mobility across 
sectors and occupations. In addition, they claim that FDI brings wage dispersion closer to the 
actual skill distribution, rather than influencing the composition of labour demand.  
Mahutga and Bandelj (2008) discuss the question of how FDI affects inequality using the 
Gini index as their measure of inequality (calculated from household earnings). They expect 
FDI to contribute to rising inequality by increasing wage inequality between management and 
labour within the foreign sector. They control for the size of the private sector, government 
spending, unemployment, and three measures of foreign investment. They use longitudinal 
data for ten Central and East European post-socialist countries, for the time from 1990 to 
2001. Their results indicate that foreign investment has a positive effect on income inequality 
in CEE, no matter how FDI is measured. FDI increases inequality between management and 
labour within the foreign-owned sector, and between foreign and domestic sectors, where 
foreign-owned firms pay higher wages relative to domestic ones. They tentatively conclude 
that inwards FDI is a powerful determinant of the behaviour of income inequality in 
transition countries. 
Franco and Gerussi (2010) analyse the effects of trade and inward FDI on income distribution 
in 18 transition economies during the period 1990-2006. They use the FE method to account 
for individual country heterogeneity and potential misspecifications. Since inequality may be 
persistent across time and dependent on factors that change slowly, they include the lagged 
                                                
2 In addition to this index, Fredom House and Polity IV were used as a democracy measure. Since polity2 (from 
Polity IV) and PR (Political Rights) and CL (Civil Liberties) are highly correlated (0.8 and 0.9) they were 
included in separate regressions. Whilst they had the expected sign, i.e. greater democracy freedom leading to 
greater wage inequality, they were not significant and their inclusion had no significant effect on coefficients of 
the other variables. To choose between fixed effects model and random effects model the Hausman’s Chi-
Square statistic was used. The test suggests that random effects could not be estimated, except when including 
the CL in the model. Results are available upon request. 
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Gini in the second step. This creates problems of endogeneity since the lagged dependent 
variable is probably correlated with the error term and they use the one step SYS-GMM 
estimator Results indicate that FDI does not seem to have a significant effect on income 
inequality, whereas increased trade leads to an initial increase in the Gini index value, which 
decreases as trade flows increase.  
Figini and Görg (2011) also analyse the relationship between FDI inflows and wage 
inequality. For this purpose, they include 103 countries in their sample, dividing them into 
developed (OECD) countries and developing (non-OECD) countries, for the period 1980 to 
2002. Following Aghion and Howitt (1998), they use an endogenous growth model where 
wage inequality is examined in a model of general purpose technology (GPT).  To measure 
wage inequality they use the Gini and Theil indices for each country-year. Figini and Görg 
suggest that the relationship is non-linear, with the effect of FDI on wage inequality 
depending on the level of economic development of countries. In developing countries 
(which includes the transition economies) wage inequality increases (albeit at a decreasing 
rate) with the FDI stock, which is in line with the inverted-U pattern for the relationship 
between FDI and wage inequality.  
Looking at firm-level studies, Earle and Telegdy (2007) address the question of public-
private and foreign-domestic wage differentials for the period from 1986 to 2003 in Hungary. 
To examine the impact of ownership on wages they estimate different specifications, but the 
results indicate that a fixed-effects specification is preferred to the OLS and a specification 
with trends to one without trends. They find a significant wage premium for state and foreign 
ownership, compared to domestic priv te ownership. In addition, they control for worker 
(such as education, experience, gender, and occupation) and firm characteristics (size, 
industry, and productivity) and find that ownership type is highly correlated with these 
characteristics. Their results suggest that the substantial unconditional wage differentials are 
explained mostly by the differences in worker and firm characteristics. The results indicate a 
small difference between the unconditional estimates and those controlling for workers 
characteristics, even though worker characteristics are highly correlated with both wages and 
ownership. Adding firm characteristics further diminishes the magnitude of foreign and state 
coefficients. They conclude that there may be no difference in the wage behaviour of foreign-
owned and state-owned firms. However, they do not give a clear explanation for their finding 
of only a small difference between the unconditional estimates and those controlling for 
workers characteristics, even though worker characteristics are highly correlated with both 
wages and ownership. 
Jensen (2009) investigates foreign subsidiaries’ performance and market efficiency effects in 
Poland during the period 1993-2004. In analysing the direct and indirect effects of FDI she 
uses firm-level panel for manufacturing sector estimating total factor productivity, labour 
productivity, employment growth, mark-up levels and profitability. To account for cross 
section dimension FGLS is used, which allows for an error term compo ent that is 
heteroscedastic or specific to each firm. The findings suggest that foreign subsidiaries in 
Poland pay higher wages and achieve higher employment growth relative to their domestic 
counterparts. 
Eriksson and Pytlikova (2011) examine the relationship between wages, labour productivity 
and ownership in the Czech Republic using a linked employer-employee dataset. Analysing 
employees’ characteristics they find that foreign-owned firms on average employ younger 
workers with shorter tenure, have almost twice as large a share of foreign employees and a 
higher share of female employees. However, there are no significant differences in 
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employment by the level of education or in the share of white-collar employees. In addition, 
foreign-owned firms are concentrated in manufacturing industry and located mainly in the 
capital city. Firm level analyses, where the dependent variable is the average firm wage, 
imply that the raw difference in average wages between foreign and domestic-owned firms is 
23.6%. This premium remains when they account for differences in the compositions in 
firms’ workforces (age and firm tenure, share of female employees and employees with 
foreign citizenship, and employees’ educational qualifications). After controlling for region, 
industry and firm size the raw difference in average wages between foreign and domestic-
owned firms reduces to 16.2%. However, analysis based on the units of observation being 
individual employees, suggest that the unconditional foreign ownership premium is 7%, 
considerably lower than those derived from the firm level analysis. In addition, the gap in 
labour productivity between foreign and domestic-owned firms is more than twice the size of 
the wage gap. Adding human capital variables increases the wage differential to 14%. 
However, this study does not provide any explanation of the empirical methodology used.  
 
To conclude, there is some empirical evidence suggesting that there is a positive the 
relationship between FDI stock and wage inequality in transition economies, however this 
relationship is likelyappears to be a complex one. FDI and trade liberalisation seem to raise 
the demand and wages for more educated and skilled workers, hence increasing wage 
inequality between skilled and unskilled workers. Firm-level empirical studies generally 
findEmpirical evidence suggests that foreign-owned firms pay higher wages relative to 
domestic ones. In part, these differences in wages can be explained by differences in worker 
characteristics, such as education, skills, age and gender, ethnicity, occupation and the 
differing wage returns for those skills (Earle and Telegdy, 2007; Jensen, 2009; Eriksson and 
Pytlikova,  2011). 
 
3. MODEL SPECIFICATION, DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
 
Jensen and Rosas (2007) argue that one should approach the analysis of the determinants of 
wage inequality very carefully since potential issues of reverse causality, selection bias, and 
omitted variables can lead to spurious results. Accordingly, several model specifications and 
tests are used to check for the robustness of the results. Due to missing data this study is 
using unbalanced panel data for up to nineteen transition countries and a fixed effects model 
to account for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity across countries and potential 
endogeneity of FDI with wage inequality. 
 
Following the above review of theoretical and empirical studies the following basic equation 
is specified:  
  
    (1) 
 
where i indexes countries, and t the time period. Inequality is a measure of wage inequality, 
for each country-year. The stock of FDI is chosen rather than the inflow in order to reflect the 
long-term effects, since FDI stocks contribute to the stock of general-purpose technology 
available in the economy (Figini and Görg, 2011). The previous discussion indicated that FDI 
may increase labour market inequality by increasing the relative demand for skilled labour 
and raising the skilled wage premium. However, as FDI increases in a country it may reduce 
wage inequality in the long run, as a result of the increased supply of skilled labour force. To 
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control for this possible non-linear effect of inward FDI the squared term of FDI is added in 
the wage inequality equation.  
 
X is a vector of control variables deduced from the discussion above; λ is a full set of time 
dummies and e is the error term. Domestic investment and R&D expenditure as a percentage 
of GDP are introduced as a proxy for technological change. The higher these rates, other 
things equal, the faster the rate of skill-biased technological progress, thereby increasing the 
proportion of skilled workers and hence the wage differential between skilled and unskilled 
workers.  Dadres and Ginther (2001) provide some evidence from the US that technology is a 
significant, but not dominant, determinant of between- and within-group earnings inequality. 
Accordingly, the expected sign of the domestic investment and R&D variables is positive. In 
addition, an openness variable (the sum of imports and exports as a share of GDP) is included 
in the model to control for the effect of increased trade volumes on wage inequality. With 
respect to trade openness H-O theory suggests that greater openness to trade should reduce 
wage inequality in developing countries by increasing the relative demand for unskilled 
labour and narrow the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers. However, empirical 
studies such as Peter (2003), Onaran and Stockhammer (2008) and Lechthaler and Mileva 
(2014) indicate that trade liberalisation can increase the wage differential between skilled and 
unskilled workers as a result of an increase in the returns to skilled labour.  Increases in GDP 
per capita should be associated with reductions in wage inequality as suggested by the 
Kuznets hypothesis. In order to test for the influence of the supply side of the labour market 
measures of the level of education of the labour force are included. Other things being equal, 
an upward shift in the supply of more educated/skilled workers should depress the skill 
premium and lower wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers. The rate of 
unemployment and institutional differences are also controlled for in the model. Most of 
transition countries are characterised by high unemployment rates and low or no safety nets 
in terms of benefits. This may affect the distribution of wages by lowering the wages of less 
skilled workers contributing to increases in wage inequality (Boeri and Terrell, 2002). To 
capture institutional differences in the labour market the Index of Economic Freedom (IEF) is 
included in the wage inequality model. The relationship between the IEF and wage inequality 
is expected to be positive since higher values of this index for a country imply less 
interference in the market, for example a weaker influence of unions and minimum wage 
legislation, leading to higher wage inequality. 
 
Wage inequality is commonly measured by the GINI coefficient which ranges from 0 to 1, 
where 0 represents complete equality (all individuals receive equa  wages) and 1 represents 
the highest level of inequality. The Gini coefficient utilised is the distribution of earnings, 
which refers to monthly wages with bonuses, for full-time employees as reported by 
employers. Gini coefficients (labelled as GINI) were obtained from the TRANSMONEE 
(2010) database. Using the GINI variable as a dependent variable equation 1 can be estimated 
for the period 1993 to 2008 for 19 transition countries3, however due to missing data the 
sample has 195 GINI observations. This measure is widely used in the empirical investigation 
of inequality even though it is not necessarily the best measure of wage inequality and 
certainly not of labour market inequality. There are significant cross-country differences in 
the collection of income data which is likely to introduce systematic and random errors in the 
data, decreasing the usefulness of the Gini coefficient. Given these limitations an alternative 
measure of wage inequality is also used: the Theil coefficient.  
                                                
3 Albania; Azerbaijan; Bulgaria; Czech Republic; Estonia; Georgia; Hungary; Kazakhstan; Kyrgyzstan; Latvia; 
Lithuania; Macedonia; Moldova; Poland; Romania; Russia; Slovakia; Slovenia and Ukraine. 
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THEIL’s T statistic, measured across sectors within each country also measures the evolution 
of wage-inequality. If every individual has exactly the same income, T will be zero; this 
represents perfect equality and is the minimum value of THEIL’s T.  If one individual has all 
of the income this represents the highest inequality and is the maximum value of Theil’s T 
statistic. The advantage of Theil’s T statistic is that one can use group level data since 
individual data are not always available.  Data come from the UTIP-UNIDO (2005) database. 
Data on THEIL coefficient for the set of countries in our sample are very limited. So, the 
period of estimation with this measure of wage inequality is from 1990 to 2002 and with 
missing values the sample has 139 observations and 15 countries4. Table 1 presents the 
summary statistics of the variables included in the regressions.  
 
Table 1. Summary statistics of the variables of interest, GINI:1993-2008; THEIL: 1990-2002 
Variable label Variable 
name  
Expected 
sign
5
 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Number 
of Obs. 
Gini GINI  0.36 0.07 0.23 0.52 195 
Theil THEIL  0.05 0.06 0.004 0.36 139 
FDI stock (% of GDP) FDI +,- 21.92 16.51 0.36 85.86 188 
Domestic Investment (% 
of GDP) 
DOM + 17.47 5.16 1.84 29.79 193 
Research and 
development 
expenditure (% of GDP) 
 
R&D + 0.61 0.33 0.17 1.62 135 
Trade (% of GDP) TRADE ? 97.64 27.67 44.25 172.79 195 
GDP per capita  GDP +,- 7705.12 5401.928 1003.97 29574.1 193 
Tertiary school 
enrolment (%) 
EDU - 41.92 18.33 11.64 86.71 169 
Labour force with 
tertiary education (%) 
LFEDU - 21.82 13.98 2.4 66.1 88 
Unemployment rate UN + 11.54 6.73 3.9 37.3 183 
Index of Economic 
Freedom 
IEF + 55.37 9.11 30 76.1 150 
 
The inward FDI stock as a percentage of GDP (FDI) is used to identify the effect of inward 
FDI on wage inequality. To account for depreciation this variable is measured as the value of 
the share of their capital and reserves (including retained profits) attributable to the parent 
enterprise, plus the net indebtedness of affiliates to the parent enterprises. Data on FDI are 
obtained from UNCTADSTAT (2011). Domestic investment (DOM) is defined as the gross 
fixed capital formation as a percentage of GDP, after deducting the FDI inflow. Both the 
gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP) and FDI inflow (% of GDP) are taken from the 
World Development Indicators (WDI, 2010) available from the World Bank. R&D is research 
and development expenditure (% of GDP) obtained from World Development Indicators 
(WDI, 2017). TRADE is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a 
                                                
4 Albania; Armenia; Azerbaijan; Bulgaria; Croatia; Hungary; Kyrgyzstan; Latvia; Lithuania; Moldova; Poland; 
Romania; Russia; Slovenia and Ukraine.  
5 Where (+, -) indicates the expected non-linear effect of the variable on wage inequality, whereas (?) indicates 
that the expected effect is ambiguous.  
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share of GDP. Data on TRADE was obtained from World Development Indicators (WDI, 
2010). The proxy for the level of economic development, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
is based on purchasing-power-parity (PPP) per capita GDP in current international dollars to 
take into account the price differentials across countries. Data was obtained from 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook Database (2010). In addition, 
two proxies for education are used, EDU and LFEDU. EDU is defined as the tertiary school 
enrolment as a percentage of gross enrolment ratio, which is the ratio of total enrolment 
regardless of age, to the population of the age group that officially corresponds to the level of 
tertiary education. Data for this proxy were obtained from World Development Indicators 
(WDI, 2010). Enrolment rates may not be the best proxy for the level of education of the 
labour force, a better proxy would be the educational qualifications of the current workforce. 
The World Development Indicators (WDI) and Global Development Finance (GDF) provide 
information on the percentage of the labour force with tertiary education (LFEDU), but as 
can be seen in Table 1 there are many missing values, therefore both proxies are used. Data 
on the unemployment rates a percentage of total labour force (UN) come from the IMF, 
World Economic Outlook Database (2010). The proxy for institutions is the Index of 
Economic Freedom (IEF) published by The Heritage Foundation (2011).  
 
4. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY  
Following the conventional procedure for panel data, the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), 
Fixed Effects (FE) and Random Effects (RE) models have been compared. As explained 
below, the appropriate estimator seems to be the FE model. To check if the model is 
misspecified diagnostic tests have been applied. The common problems associated with panel 
estimations such as slope homogeneity, cross-sectional dependence in the error, groupwise 
heteroscedasticity, serial correlation in the errors and normality of the errors have been 
investigated. These tests are explained below. Robust standard errors are used to account for 
the heteroscedasticity problem. First, to check for the non-linearity of FDI the FE model was 
estimated introducing the squared term of FDI. Second, three additional explanatory 
variables, R&D expenditures as a percentage of GDP, labour force with tertiary education 
and the Index of Economic Freedom were introduced into the model. These three variables 
were not included in the first specification since they reduce significantly the number of 
observations. Moreover, the possibility of spurious regression was investigated, unit root tests 
were undertaken to check if the variables are stationary. Some cross sections for some 
variables have very short time dimensions and also missing values, whereas for small T, 
panel unit root tests have low power and there is the potential risk of concluding that the 
whole panel is nonstationary even when there is a large proportion of stationary series in the 
panel (Baltagi, 2005). Since the main variables of interest (GINI and FDI) are stationary and 
given that the potential danger of spurious regression in the case of a unit root if the model 
had non-stationary variables on both the left and right- hand sides, the empirical analysis 
proceeded under the assumption that there is no unit root in the panel6. As a robustness check 
the estimates of the basic equation were replicated by using the THEIL coefficients as the 
dependent variable. In addition, to control for the time-varying trend the test for common 
factor restrictions (CFR) was conducted allowing modelling the unobserved components 
when using THEIL.  
 
FE is the preferred model and it is likely to have better small sample properties than a random 
effects model and can be estimated for unbalanced panels as is the case here. The fixed 
                                                
6 See Appendix 1 for more details on the unit root tests.   
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effects model has constant slopes but intercepts differ according to the cross-sectional group, 
i.e. by country, allowing for individual country heterogeneity and accounting for potential 
omitted variables and misspecification. In the fixed effects (LSDV) model the effects of 
explanatory variables are estimated only from within-group variation (Greene, 2002). The 
basic static wage inequality model is estimated with period dummy variables, in order to 
minimise the cross-country correlation in the error terms arising from economic cycle effects 
as a result of the transition process. It is a key estimation issue whether FDI should be 
considered as an endogenous variable. Inward FDI flows at the national level are 
hypothesised to be determined by international differences in the return to capital, which are 
largely exogenous to local labour markets (Feenstra and Hanson, 1995). However, the 
possibility that wage inequality is a determinant of FDI cannot be excluded. The problem of 
inverse causality could occur since FDI may disproportionately locate to areas characterised 
by a higher level of inequality (Franco and Gerussi, 2010). One commonly used method to 
deal with the endogeneity problem is the GMM estimator (Arellano and Bond,1991, 
Arellano- and Bover, 1995 and /Blundell and Bond, 1998). Roodman (2006) argues that this 
is an appropriate approach for situations with small T, large N panels, with independent 
variables that are not strictly exogenous, meaning that they may be correlated with past and 
possibly current realizations of the error; with fixed effects; and with heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation within individuals. This is not the case in this study since T and N are close to 
each other (T=16, N=19)7. Another way of dealing with the potential endogeneity problem is 
to use instrumental variables (IV) methods. However, finding a good instrumental variable 
for an endogenous explanatory variable is very difficult given the limitations of the available 
data. Under the assumption that the correlation of FDI with the error term is fixed over time, 
controlling for country fixed effects alleviates the problem of potential endogeneity (Figini 
and Görg, 2011).   
 
Diagnostics for panel analysis are not well developed, especially for unbalanced and small 
panels. However, the available diagnostic testing can provide some useful indicators, 
therefore diagnostics have been applied to the chosen FE model both in levels and log-linear 
form. The second approach is preferred since on checking for normality the test and the plot 
of residuals indicate the presence of non-normality in levels and serial correlation is also 
improved with logs.  
 
The results suggest no slope homogeneity, heteroscedasticity, serial correlation and the 
residuals are normally distributed. The problem of heteroscedasticity and serial correlation is 
addressed using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors. Given that the unobservable common factors 
are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables, the coefficient estimates from the FE 
estimator are still consistent but inefficient and the standard error estimates of commonly 
applied covariance matrix estimation techniques are biased.  Driscoll and Kraay (1998) 
propose a nonparametric covariance matrix estimator that produces heteroskedasticity- and 
autocorrelation-consistent standard errors that are robust to general forms of spatial and 
temporal dependence (Hoechle, 2007). 
  
To improve the statistical characteristics of the FE model and to test for non-linearity of FDI 
the squared term of FDI stock (SQFDI) has been introduced. Applying diagnostic tests to this 
                                                
7 A GMM estimator is used only as a robustness check and the preferred model is Fixed Effects. The system 
GMM estimator seems to be consistent since there is no second-order serial correlation in the residuals (AR2 
statistic, p=0.32) and the Sargan test shows that there are no problems with the validity of the instruments used 
(p=0.99). However, the results indicate that only the lagged Gini and unemployment are significant. 
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model the results indicate that a heteroscedasticity problem is still present8, there is no slope 
homogeneity or first order autocorrelation and residuals are normally distributed. In order to 
further control for the effect of technological change and education on wage inequality, an 
alternative measure of technological change and education is added to the model, namely the 
R&D as a percentage of GDP and the proportion of the labour force with tertiary education 
(LFEDU). Additionally, the Index of Economic Freedom (IEF) is included to control for 
institutional differences. This model is estimated with and without the squared term of FDI 
stock. The number of total observations when including LFEDU and IEF is reduced from 157 
to 70, therefore these results are used primarily as a robustness check. For comparison the 
estimates of the basic equation are replicated by using THEIL coefficients in log-linear form 
to account for non-normality of the distribution of residuals9.  
 
If the unobserved components that create interdependencies across cross-sections are 
correlated with the included regressors, fixed effects estimators will be biased and 
inconsistent (Hoyos and Sarafidis, 2006). Even though the tests suggested that there is zero 
cross dependence in the errors, for the reasons indicated above the fixed effects regression 
with AR(1) disturbances was estimated. AR(1) is the correct specification only if common 
factor restrictions hold (CFRs). The test on common factor restrictions is performed both in 
the OLS regression and in the FE regression. In the OLS estimation the coefficient on the 
lagged dependent variable is subject to maximum upward bias, whereas in fixed effects 
estimation the coefficient on the lagged dependant variable is subject to maximum downward 
bias (Roodman, 2009). The CFRs indicate that there might be some information missing in 
the specification, e.g. dynamics in the model, however it is not known from which variable 
they derive. Hence, if they are not accounted in the model they are in the residual. 
Accordingly, if the CFRs hold in both estimations the model can be estimated with AR(1) 
correction. Results indicate that in the OLS estimation the CFRs hold, but in the FE 
regression CFRs do not hold for DOM, TRADE, UN and IEF. Hence, the AR(1) is not 
applied when using GINI as dependent variable.  As in the case with the GINI coefficients, 
the test for CFR is conducted allowing modelling with the AR(1) correction when using 
THEIL as the dependent variable. However, the CFR test could not be performed including 
all variables since there are not enough observations in this case, so LFEDU and IEF are not 
included in the test.  
 
5. RESULTS 
 
This section presents estimation results based on the three alternative measures of wage 
inequality. Table 2 presents the results of estimating equation (1) in log form with the GINI 
coefficients as the dependent variable. Columns (1) and (2) provide results for regressions of 
FE using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors, respectively including the simple FDI term and the 
quadratic specification. In column (3) the alternative proxy for technological change is 
included (R&D) in addition to DOM. Columns (4) and (5) replicate the estimations adding 
LFEDU and IEF in the model, with and without SQFDI, however excluding R&D. In the 
case of using the THEIL coefficients as a measure of wage inequality, Table  3 reports the 
results of FE using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors and the results of AR(1) correction. 
                                                
8 As above this problem is addressed using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors. 
9 Using Theil data (T=13 and N=14) the appropriate estimator seems to be the FE model since there are only 95 
observations and including all variables leaves only 30 observations and 8 groups. Testing the hypothesis that 
the coefficients of the variables are jointly equal to zero there is insufficient evidence to reject H0 (p value is 
0.3), this model is estimated without time dummies to avoid the loss of degrees of freedom. 
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Overall, the results indicate a positive relationship between FDI stock and wage inequality in 
transition countries.  
 
With GINI as the dependent variable, Table 2 indicates that the FDI coefficient (FDI stock as 
percentage of GDP) is positive and significant in the specifications in which the squared term 
of FDI is not included, and it is very similar in terms of magnitude, consistent with the 
finding of Franco and Gerussi (2010) and Figini and Görg (2011). This suggests that if the 
share of FDI in GDP increases by 1% wage inequality will increase for 0.05% (column 1); or 
by 0.06% including LFEDU and IEF in the model (column 4). There is no clear evidence of a 
concave relationship between FDI and wage inequality in transition countries, which may not 
be surprising considering that transition economies have not yet attracted high levels of FDI. 
The SQFDI is significant only in column (2) at 10% level of significance.  
 
The coefficients of DOM and R&D do not have the expected sign and are significant at 5% in 
the regressions using all variables in columns (3) and (4) and (5). A higher rate of domestic 
investment, other things equal, should be associated with more capital-intensive and skill-
intensive production that should, other things being equal, increase inequality. However, the 
negative sign in this case may indicate that domestic investment in these transition economies 
are associated with less-capital and less-skill intensive production leading to reductions in 
wage inequality. The coefficient on trade is positive and significant at 1% and 5% when 
including all variables indicating that 1% increase in the share of trade in GDP raises wage 
inequality by 0.14%. The coefficient of GDP per capita is negative and significant indicating 
that the higher is the level of development of the country the lower is the wage inequality. 
The impact of education seems to differ across different specifications. The EDU coefficients 
look very similar in terms of magnitude and statistical significance in columns (1), (2) and (3) 
suggesting that wage inequality increases as the education of the potential labour force 
increases which is contrary to the prediction of orthodox theory. However, as argued above, 
enrolment rates may not be the best proxy for the workforce’s level of education since wage 
inequality is more likely to be affected by the level of education of the current, rather than 
future, workers. The results of the alternative measure of education (LFEDU) significant at 
1% level of significance suggest that for 1% increase in LFEDU decreases wage inequality 
by around 0.05%, in line with our theoretical framework. Unemployment is not significant in 
any specification. The last variable included in the model, IEF, has the expected positive sign 
and is significant at 1% suggesting that, as anticipated, greater economic freedom is 
associated, other things being equal, with greater wage inequality.  
 
Table 2. Fixed effects regressions (dependent variable is GINI) 
 Fixed 
effects 
Fixed 
effects 
Fixed 
effects 
Fixed 
effects 
Fixed 
effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES GINI GINI GINI GINI GINI 
FDI 0.051*** 0.026 0.040 0.065*** 0.049** 
 (0.015) (0.018) (0.065) (0.008) (0.019) 
SQFDI  0.008* -0.007  0.005 
  (0.004) (0.012)  (0.005) 
DOM -0.029 -0.022 -0.027** -0.062** -0.055** 
 (0.021) (0.020) (0.010) (0.024) (0.022) 
R&D   -0.098***   
   (0.029)   
TRADE 0.051 0.058 0.107** 0.144*** 0.138*** 
 (0.039) (0.038) (0.038) (0.025) (0.026) 
GDP -0.231** -0.204** 0.005 -0.244*** -0.259*** 
Page 15 of 28 International Journal of Social Economics
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
International Journal of Social Econom
ics
  
 16 
 (0.086) (0.088) (0.082) (0.056) (0.061) 
EDU 0.139*** 0.119*** 0.172** 0.065* 0.063* 
 (0.042) (0.045) (0.072) (0.035) (0.035) 
LFEDU    -0.049** -0.048*** 
    (0.017) (0.015) 
UN -0.033 -0.030 0.042 -0.008 -0.012 
 (0.027) (0.029) (0.024) (0.023) (0.025) 
IEF    0.396*** 0.391*** 
    (0.084) (0.084) 
Constant 0.126 -0.078  -1.205*** -1.023** 
 (0.888) (0.835)  (0.318) (0.464) 
Observations 157 157 114 70 70 
Number of 
groups 
18 18 18 13 13 
All variables are in log form 
Drisc/Kraay standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Regressions include a full set of time dummies 
 
 
The results where the THEIL coefficient is the dependent variable are reported in Table 3. 
Again there is some evidence of a positive effect of FDI (% of GDP) on wage inequality. 
Results indicate that a 1% increase in the share of FDI in GDP increases wage inequality by 
0.2%. The squared term of FDI (% of GDP) is not significant, whereas in the AR (1) model 
only GDP, EDU and UN seem to be significant (column 3 and 4). 
 
Table 3. Fixed effects regressions (dependent variable is THEIL) 
  Drisc/Kraay 
Std.Err. 
Drisc/Kraay 
Std.Err. 
AR(1) AR(1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES THEIL THEIL THEIL THEIL 
FDI 0.229*** 0.214*** 0.167 0.118 
 (0.067) (0.053) (0.185) (0.244) 
SQFDI  0.017  0.016 
  (0.027)  (0.053) 
DOM 0.391 0.440 0.152 0.166 
 (0.271) (0.281) (0.264) (0.270) 
TRADE -0.235 -0.340 0.068 0.046 
 (0.379) (0.481) (0.453) (0.462) 
GDP -0.284 -0.445 -1.346*** -1.321*** 
 (0.564) (0.509) (0.349) (0.363) 
EDU 0.588* 0.573 1.310*** 1.263** 
 (0.315) (0.334) (0.467) (0.502) 
UN 0.247** 0.251** 0.242* 0.249* 
 (0.088) (0.084) (0.135) (0.139) 
Constant -4.068 -2.375 2.187*** 2.200*** 
  (3.792) (3.809) (0.414) (0.416) 
Observations 
Number of groups 
Number of index 
95 
14 
95 
14 
 
81 
 
 
14 
81 
 
 
14 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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All variables are in log form    
 
Overall, the results are broadly consistent with previous findings and indicate that FDI 
increases labour market inequality by increasing the relative demand for skilled labour and 
raising the skilled wage premium. (Bruno et al., 2004; Earle and Telegdy; 2007; Jensen, 
2009; Franco and Gerussi, 2010 and Figini and Görg, 2011). Increased trade also leads to an 
increase in the Gini index value suggesting that trade liberalisation can increase the wage 
differential between skilled and unskilled workers as a result of an increase in the returns to 
skilled labour, this is consistent with the findings  of Peter (2003), Onaran and Stockhammer 
(2008) and Lechthaler and Mileva (2014). 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
Using two alternative measures of wage inequality this paper has examined the effect of FDI 
on wage inequality in selected transition countries. Several model specification and tests have 
been used to obtain consistent estimates and to check for the robustness of the results. The 
results indicate that a rising share of FDI in GDP increased wage inequality in transition 
economies, though its overall effect was relatively small. This finding is consistent with those 
of most studies of this relationship in developed and developing countries (Hale and Xu, 
2016), though given the labour market conditions in ETEs the effect of FDI on wage 
inequality is relatively weaker than anticipated. Results using GINI indicate that if the share 
of FDI in GDP increases by 1% wage inequality will increase by justfor 0.05%. Considering 
the long run effect of FDI on wage inequality there is no clear evidence of a concave 
relationship between FDI and wage inequality in transition countries, which may not be 
surprising considering that few transition economies have, as yet, attracted high levels of 
FDI. There is also some evidence of a positive effect of FDI as a share of GDP on wage 
inequality using THEIL coefficients as a measure of wage inequality. Among the control 
variables some support for the Kuznets hypothesis is found, i.e. increases in GDP per capita 
are associated with reductions in wage inequality. In addition, there is no evidence for the H-
O theory that greater trade openness reduces wage inequality. In line with the theoretical 
discussion, increases in the supply of more educated workers lowers wage inequality in 
transition economies. 
 
In sum, the empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that an increased FDI inward stock as 
a share of GDP increases wage inequality in transition economies, however this relationship 
may be a complex one. Differences in average wages, wage differentials, employment shares 
of skilled workers and relative size of the foreign-owned sector are all likely to be important 
in determining for the overall behaviour of wage inequality. In addition,Whilst the 
distribution of FDI across industrial sectors may also explain the diversity of cross-country 
experiences since Bogliaccini and Egan (2017) found that FDI inflows to the service sector 
had the largest impact on raising inequality in middle income countries. 
 
Consideration of the combined effects of FDI on labour markets in ETEs suggest that there 
are overall benefits. Productivity and wages increase as does the overall skill level of the 
labour force. The disproportional growth in the demand for skilled labour should over time 
induce current and future workers to invest in additional education and training. Thus, FDIs 
small effect on increasing wage inequality and any negative spillovers on domestic firms, 
such as a loss of skilled employees, are unlikely to warrant governments placing restrictions 
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on inwards FDI. Policy-makers should instead consider addressing the causes of shortages in 
the supply of skilled labour. This may require targeted interventions supporting education and 
training providers and encouraging unskilled workers to retrain.  
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Appendix 1- Unit root test 
 
Investigating for spurious regressions we test for unit root or non-stationarity in the panel 
dataset. Stata xtunitroot command performs several tests for panel data unit roots. The Levin-
Lin-Chu (2002), Harris-Tzavalis (1999), Breitung (2000; Breitung and Das 2005), Im-Pesaran-
Shin (2003), and Fisher-type (Choi 2001) tests have the null hypothesis that all the panels 
contain a unit root. The Hadri (2000) Lagrange multiplier (LM) test has as the null hypothesis 
that all the panels are stationary (Maddala and Wu, 1999). However most of the tests require 
balanced data. The Im-Pesaran-Shin and Fisher-type tests allow for unbalanced data, but the Im-
Pesaran-Shin test cannot have gaps in data. Therefore the only test which can be implemented in 
this study is the Fisher-type test. The null hypothesis is that all series are non-stationary against 
the alternative that at least one series in the panel is stationary. The Fisher test is based on 
combining the p-values of the test-statistic for a unit root in each cross-sectional unit, it is non-
parametric which gives the  p-values 1i and then -2∑loge	i ̴ χ
2
 with 2N d.f., where N is the 
number of separate samples (Maddala and Wu, 1999). The test statistics for the Fisher-type panel 
unit root test are reported in the table below.  Out of the ten panel variables, the test statistics are 
significant for seven variables at 5% level, rejecting the null hypothesis of unit root. In addition 
to the unit root test all variables are plotted to check for stationarity (results are available upon 
request). As the graphs show some cross sections for some variables have very short time 
dimensions and considering the alternative hypothesis that at least one series in the panel is 
stationary one can not make a strong conclusion that there is a unit root in the panel. In addition, 
the test statistic for this test is valid when T approaches to infinity, which implies a long time 
period, whereas the time period in our estimati ns is quite short. “For small T, panel unit root 
tests have low power and there is the potential risk of concluding that the whole panel is 
nonstationary even when there is a large proportion of stationary series in the panel” (Baltagi, 
2005, p.247). Since the main variables of interest (GINI and FDI) are found to be stationary, 
while the potential danger of spurious regression in the case of a unit root would be more of a 
problem if the model had non-stationary variables both on the left and right hand side, we 
proceeded with the empirical analysis under the assumption that there is no unit root in the panel.  
 
Fisher Test for panel unit root using an augmented Dickey-Fuller test (0 lags) 
Variable 
H0: unit root 
T-statistic (TS) Prob. <> CV 
(5%) 
Decision 
GINI chi2(34)=108.79 0.00 > 48.60 If TS>CV  Reject H0 
(Stationary) 
THEIL chi2(30)=83.55 0.00 > 43.77 If TS>CV  Reject H0 
(Stationary) 
FDI chi2(32)= 362.08 0.00 > 46.19 If TS>CV  Reject H0 
(Stationary) 
SQFDI chi2(32)= 115.69 0.00 > 46.19 If TS>CV  Reject H0 
(Stationary) 
DOM chi2(34)=49.29 0.04 > 48.60 If TS>CV  Reject H0 
(Stationary) 
TRADE chi2(34)=115.49 0.00 > 48.60 If TS>CV  Reject H0 
(Stationary) 
GDP chi2(30)=17.58 0.96 < 43.77 If TS<CV  There is insufficient 
evidence to reject H0 
(Unit root) 
EDU chi2(30)=10.20 0.99 < 43.77 If TS<CV  There is insufficient 
evidence to reject H0 
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(Unit root) 
LFEDU chi2(18)= 4.01 0.99 < 28.87 If TS<CV  There is insufficient 
evidence to reject H0 
(Unit root) 
UN chi2(32)=51.99 0.01 > 46.19 If TS>CV  Reject H0 
(Stationary) 
IEF chi2(30)= 196.26 0.00 > 43.77 If TS>CV  Reject H0 
(Stationary) 
Note: All variables are in log form.  
 
Plot of the variables to check for stationarity 
Plot of GINI1 variable 
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Plot of FDI stock variable 
 
Plot of Domestic Investment variable 
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Plot of TRADE variable 
 
 
Plot of GDP per capita  
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Plot of Tertiary School Enrolment variable 
 
Plot of Labour Force with Tertiary Education variable 
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Plot of Unemployment Rate variable 
 
Plot of Index of Economic Freedom variable 
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Plot of THEIL variable 
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